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Abstract
Private data are valuable either by remaining private (for instance if they are
sensitive) or, on the other hand, by being used publicly to increase some utility.
These two objectives are antagonistic and leaking data might be more rewarding
than concealing them. Unlike classical concepts of privacy that focus on the first
point, we consider instead agents that optimize a natural trade-off between both
objectives. We formalize this as an optimization problem where the objective
mapping is regularized by the amount of information leaked by the agent into the
system (measured as a divergence between the prior and posterior on the private
data). Quite surprisingly, when combined with the entropic regularization, the
Sinkhorn divergence naturally emerges in the optimization objective, making it
efficiently solvable. We apply these techniques to preserve some privacy in online
repeated auctions.
1 Introduction
Preserving privacy of data is a growing concern, in particular in machine learning. The classical
frameworks in private learning aim at protecting sensitive data, e.g., in the medical field, where some
secret information should not be publicly revealed or where the anonymity of databases must not
be breached by outsiders. Algorithms must then guarantee privacy at all costs. This often leads to a
large utility difference in comparison with an agent using this data without any privacy concern.
In some other situations, private data is an economic resource with a positive value that can be used
publicly to optimize some utility. An agent is willing to use and reveal some private information,
only if she gets a subsequent utility increase in return. The privacy is not a constraint anymore but
becomes part of the objective which is then to decide how and when to use this information. This is
kind of similar to a poker player deciding to bluff or not. In some situations, it might be interesting to
focus solely on the utility, at the cost of a high privacy loss, while in other situations, the immediate
profit for using the private data is too small, and playing independently of it (or bluffing) is better.
After a rigorous mathematical formulation of this utility/privacy trade-off, it appears that this problem
can be recast as a regularized optimal transport minimization. In the specific case of entropic regular-
ization, this problem has received a lot of interest in the recent years as it provides a computationally
tractable way to approximate an optimal transport distance between distributions and is thus used in a
lot of applications [13]. Our work showcases how the new Privacy-Regularized Learning problem
benefits in practice from this theory.
Private Learning. Differential privacy is currently the most widely used private learning framework
[15, 16, 41]. It prevents any private value of an individual to be inferred from a public aggregate
information. It can be achieved by adding random noise to either the input, the output or the
gradient during the learning process [10, 14, 31]. Its popularity is due to its simple, clear mathematic
formulation yet with strong privacy guarantees [8]. However, its constraints are too restrictive for
many problems and can lead to a low average utility [31]. Some relaxations of the differential privacy
have been proposed to overcome this point [48, 7, 37, 31]. In particular, it is possible to consider
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average privacy leakage instead of (δ−)worst case [17, 7], or to consider only inference from some
(known) prior instead of all adjacent databases [48, 30].
The objective of private learning is to limit adversarial inference attacks. Different types of attack
exist. Here, we aim at preventing attribute inference attacks [21, 53, 37], whose goal is to infer
the value of private features given public observation. We thus compare the posterior and prior
distributions of the private information, as done in the rational inattention literature [46, 36, 35, 18].
Optimal privacy preserving mechanisms have been recently studied for similar privacy measures,
under specific conditions and strong privacy constraints [18]. Privacy can however be directly
considered as a cost in the overall objective and an optimal strategy thus reveals information only if it
actually leads to a significant increase in utility, whereas constrained algorithms automatically reveal
as much as allowed by the constraints, without incorporating the additional cost of this revelation.
Optimal Transport. Finding an appropriate way to compare probability distributions is a major
challenge in learning theory. Optimal Transport manages to provide powerful tools to compare
distributions in metric spaces [51]. As a consequence, it has known an increasing interest these past
years [44], especially for generative models [3, 25, 43]. However, such powerful distances often
come at the expense of heavy computational costs, which are not suitable to learning algorithms.
It was recently showcased that adding an entropic regularization term allows fast computation of
approximated distances using Sinkhorn algorithm [47, 13]. Since then, the Sinkhorn divergence has
shown promising results for applications such as generative models [24, 25], domain adaptation [12]
and supervised learning [22], besides having nice theoretical properties [40, 20, 23].
Contributions and Organization of the paper. The new framework of Privacy-Regularized Learn-
ing is motivated by several applications, presented in Section 2. This problem is mathematically
formulated as some optimization problem, which is convex if the privacy cost of the model belongs
to some class of divergences (yet eventually in an infinite dimensional space), see Section 4. Also, if
the private information space is discrete, this problem admits an optimal discrete distribution. The
minimization problem then becomes dimensionally finite, but non-convex.
The mutual information between the public action and the private type is often used as a privacy
measure (see [48]). If we consider this quantity as the privacy cost function, the Privacy-Regularized
Learning becomes a Sinkhorn divergence minimization problem, so we are able in Section 5 to
develop and use recent machinery for this problem. Finally, with a linear utility cost, the problem
is equivalent to minimizing the difference of two convex functions. Using these theories, we can
compare different optimization methods and illustrate the practical aspect of the model. This is done
in Section 6 where we also run experiments on private learning of repeated auctions.
2 Some Applications
Our model is motivated by different applications that we describe in this section, such as online
repeated auctions and learning models on servers.
2.1 Online repeated auctions
When a website wants to sell an advertisement slot, firms such as Google or Criteo take part in an
auction to buy this slot for one of their client, a process illustrated in Figure 1. As this interaction
happens each time a user lands on the website, this is no longer a one-time auction problem, but
repeated auctions where the seller and/or the competitor might observe not just one bid, but a
distribution of bids. As a consequence, if a firm were bidding truthfully, seller and other bidders
would have access to its true value distribution µ. This has two possible downsides.
First, if the value distribution µ was known to the auctioneer, she could maximize her revenue at the
expense of the bidder utility [1, 2, 19, 27], for instance with personalized reserve prices. Second, the
auctioneer can sometimes take part in the auction and becomes a direct concurrent of the bidder (this
might be a unique characteristic of online repeated auctions for ads). For instance, Google is both
running some auction platforms and bidding on some ad slots for their client. As a consequence, if
the distribution µ was perfectly revealed by a firm, its adversaries could use it in the future against it,
by bidding more or less aggressively or by trying to conquer new markets.
It is also closely related to online pricing or repeated posted price auctions. When a user wants to buy
a flight ticket (or any other good), the selling company can learn the value distribution of the buyer
and can then dynamically adapt its prices in order to increase its revenue. The user can prevent this
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Figure 1: Online advertisement auction system.
learning in order to maximize her long term utility, even if it means refusing some apparently good
offers in the short term (in poker lingo, she would be “bluffing”).
2.2 Learning a model through external servers
Nowadays, several servers or clusters allow their clients to perform heavy computations remotely,
for instance to learn some model parameters of a given training set (say, by training a deep neural
net). The privacy concern when querying a server can sometimes be handled using homomorphic
encryption [26, 5, 45], if the cluster is designed in that way (typically a public model has been learned
on the server). In this case, the client sends an encrypted testing set to the server, receives new
predictions from the server and recovers them for the accurate testing set. This technique, when
available, is powerful, but requires heavy computations locally.
Consider instead a client wanting to learn a new model (say, a linear/logistic regression or any neural
net) on a dataset that has some private component. Directly sending the training set would reveal the
whole data to the server owner, besides the risk of someone else observing it. So, the agent might
prefer to send slightly perturbed datasets, so that the returned parameters remain close to the accurate
ones, with the data not completely revealed. If the data contain sensitive information on individuals,
then differential privacy is an appropriate solution. However, it is often the case that this private part
is just a single information of the client itself (say, its margin, or its current wealth, or its total number
of users, etc.) that is crucial to the final model learned but should be kept more or less secret. Then
differential privacy is no longer the solution, as there is only a single data to protect and/or to use.
Indeed, some privacy leakage is allowed and can lead to much more accurate parameters returned by
the server and a higher utility at the end; the Privacy-Regularized Learning aims at computing the
best dataset to send to the server, in order to maximize the utility-privacy trade-off.
2.3 Toy Example
We finally introduce a simple toy example illustrating this privacy concept, whose formal and general
model is introduced in Section 3. Suppose an agent is publicly playing an action x ∈ X to minimize
a loss x>ck, where ck is some loss vector. The true type k ∈ [K] is private, only known to the agent,
but drawn from p0. Without privacy concern, the agent would then solve for every k, minx∈X x>ck.
Let us denote by x∗k the optimal solution of that problem. Recall that besides maximizing her reward,
the agent wants to protect her private information k (call it her “type”) and that after observing the
action x taken by the agent, an adversary can update her posterior distribution px on the hidden type.
If the agent were to play deterministically x∗k when her type is k, then the adversary could infer the
true value of k based on the played action. The agent can and should choose her action randomly to
hide her true type to the adversary. So given a type k, the strategy of the agent is now a probability
distribution µk over X and her expected reward is then Ex∼µk
[
x>ck
]
. In this case, the posterior
distribution after playing the action x is computed using Bayes rule and if the different µk have the
same support, then the posterior distribution is no longer a Dirac mass: some privacy is conserved.
The agent aims at minimizing both the objective linear loss and simultaneously the amount of
information given to this adversary. A common way to measure it is given by the Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence between the prior and the posterior [46]: KL(px, p0) =
∑K
k=1 log
(
px(k)
p0(k)
)
px(k),
where px(k) =
p0(k)µk(x)∑K
l=1 p0(l)µl(x)
. If the agent has some privacy concern scaling with λ > 0, the
regularized loss of the agent is then x>ck+λKL(px, p0) instead of x>ck. Overall, the global objective
of the agent is the minimization of
∑K
k=1 p0(k)Ex∼µk
[
x>ck + λKL(px, p0)
]
over µ1, . . . , µK .
In the limit case λ = 0, the agent maximizes her reward without any privacy concern. She determinis-
tically plays x∗k given k. When λ =∞, the agent only focuses on privacy and thus looks for the best
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action chosen independently of the type: x ⊥ k. It corresponds to a so called non-revealing strategy
in game theory and the best strategy is then to play arg minx x
>c[p0] where c[p0] =
∑K
k=1 p0(k)ck.
For a positive λ, the behavior of the player will interpolate between these two extreme strategies.
This privacy preserving problem is related to repeated games with incomplete information [4],
where players have private information affecting their utility functions. Playing actions leak some
information to the other players, who then change their strategies in consequence. The goal is then to
control the amount of information leaked to the adversaries in order to maximize its own utility. In
practice, it can be impossible to compute the best adversarial strategy, because the player is often
unaware of how the adversary would use this revealed information. Our framework then models this
utility loss caused by adversarial actions as a function of the revealed amount of information.
3 A general model
We now introduce formally the general model sketched by the previous toy example. The agent (or
player) has a private type y ∈ Y drawn according to a prior p0 whose support can be infinite. She
then chooses an action x ∈ X to maximize her utility, which depends on both her action and her
type. Meanwhile, she wants to preserve the privacy of the type y. Her strategy is thus a mapping
Y → ∆(X ), where ∆(X ) denotes the set of distributions over X ; for the sake of conciseness, we
denote by X|Y ∈ ∆(X )Y such a strategy. In the toy example, this mapping was given by k 7→ µk.
The adversary only observes her action x and tries to infer the type of the agent. We assume a perfect
adversary, i.e., she can exactly compute the posterior distribution.
Let c(x, y) be the utility loss for playing x ∈ X with the type y ∈ Y . The loss due to privacy leakage
corresponds to cpriv(X,Y ) where (X,Y ) is the joint distribution of the action and the type. In the toy
example given in Section 2.3, the utility cost was given by c(x, k) = x>ck and the privacy cost was
the KL divergence between the prior and posterior. The privacy cost of differential privacy is
cpriv(X,Y ) = max
(x,y,y′)
{∣∣ log P(x | Y = y))
P(x | Y = y′))
∣∣ ; dh(y, y′) = 1}
where dh is the Hamming distance [15]. The objective is to minimize the utility loss with a privacy
leakage below some threshold ε ≥ 0, i.e., minimize E(x,y)∼(X,Y )
[
c(x, y)
]
such that cpriv(X,Y ) ≤ ε.
Here, the privacy leakage has some utility loss scaling with λ > 0, which can be seen as the value of
information. The final objective of the agent is then to minimize the following loss:
inf
X|Y ∈∆(X )Y
E(x,y)∼(X,Y )
[
c(x, y)
]
+ λ cpriv(X,Y ). (1)
As mentioned above, the goal is to limit the risk or the extent of type inference by the adversary.
Therefore, the privacy cost is here defined as the expected value of a measure between the posterior
px and the prior distribution p0 of the type, i.e., cpriv(X,Y ) = Ex∼XD(px, p0) for some function D.
In the toy example of Section 2.3, D(px, p0) = KL(px, p0).
In order to have a simpler formulation of the problem, we remark that instead of defining a strategy by
the conditional distributionX|Y , it is equivalent to see it as a joint distribution (X,Y ), with a marginal
over the type equal to the prior. Moreover, for a distribution γ ∈ ∆(X×Y), we denote by pi1#γ (resp.
pi2#γ) the marginal distribution ofX (resp. Y ): pi1#γ(A) = γ(A×Y) and pi2#γ(B) = γ(X ×B).
The remaining of the paper focuses on the problem below, which we call Privacy-Regularized
Learning. With the privacy cost defined as above, the minimization problem (1) is equivalent to
inf
γ∈∆(X×Y)
pi2#γ=p0
∫
X×Y
c(x, y) dγ(x, y) + λ
∫
X×Y
D (px, p0) dγ(x, y). (PRL)
4 An infinite dimensional convex minimization problem
In this section, we study some properties of the Problem (PRL) for specific privacy costs. Recall that
D is an f -divergence, if for all distributions P,Q such that P is absolutely continuous with respect to
Q, D(P,Q) =
∫
Y f
(
dP (y)
dQ(y)
)
dQ(y) where f is a convex function defined on R∗+ such that f(1) = 0.
The set of f -divergences is large and includes common divergences such as the Kullback-Leibler
divergence, the reverse Kullback-Leibler or the Total Variation distance.
Also, the min-entropy defined by D(P,Q) = log (ess sup dP/dQ) is widely used in private learning
[50, 48]. It corresponds to the limit of the Renyi divergence ln
(∑n
i=1 p
α
i q
1−α
i
)
/(α − 1), when
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α → +∞ [42, 37]. Although it is not an f -divergence, the Renyi divergence derives from the
f -divergence associated to the convex function t 7→ (tα−1)/(α−1). f -divergences do not represent
all the common privacy costs, but they are strongly related to many of them as we just illustrated. If
we restrict the privacy costs to f -divergences, (PRL) becomes a convex minimization problem.
Theorem 1. If D is an f -divergence, (PRL) is a convex problem in γ ∈ ∆(X )×∆(Y).
The proof is given in Appendix A. Although ∆(X )×∆(Y) has generally an infinite dimension, it is
dimensionally finite if both sets X and Y are discrete. A minimum can then be found using classical
optimization methods such as gradient descent. In the following, D is an f -divergence.
4.1 Discrete type space
We assume here that X is an infinite action space and Y of cardinality K (or equivalently, that p0 is a
discrete prior of sizeK), so that it can be written as p0 =
∑K
k=1 p
k
0δyk . For a fixed joint distribution γ,
let the measure µk be defined for any A ⊂ X by µk(A) = γ(A×{yk}) and µ =
∑K
k=1 µk = pi1#γ.
The function pk(x) = dµk(x)dµ(x) , defined over the support of µ by absolute continuity, is the posterior
probability of having the type k when playing x. In this specific setting, the tuple (µ, (pk)k) exactly
determines γ. (PRL) is then equivalent to:
inf
µ,(pk(·))1≤k≤K
pk≥0,∑Kl=1 pl(·)=1
{∑
k
∫
X
[
pk(x)c(x, yk)+λp
k
0f
(
pk(x)
pk0
)]
dµ(x); ∀k ≤ K,
∫
X
pk(x)dµ(x) = pk0
}
. (2)
For fixed posterior distributions pk, this is a generalized moment problem on the distribution µ [33].
The same types of arguments can then be used for the existence and the form of optimal solutions.
Theorem 2. If the prior is dicrete of size K, for all ε > 0, (PRL) has an ε-optimal solution µ with a
finite support of at most K + 2 points.
The proof is delayed to Appendix A. If the support of γ is included in {(xi, yk) | 1 ≤ i ≤ K+2, 1 ≤
k ≤ K}, we denote it, with a slight abuse of notations, as a matrix γi,k := γ({(xi, yk)}).
Lemma 1. In the case of a discrete prior p0 =
∑K
k=1 p
k
0δyk , (PRL) is equivalent to:
inf
(γ,x)∈R(K+2)×K+ ×XK+2
∀k≤K, ∑i γi,k=pk0
∑
i,k
γi,k c(xi, yk) + λ
∑
i,k
pk0 ×
(
K∑
m=1
γi,m
)
× f
(
γi,k
pk0
∑
m γi,m
)
. (3)
Theorem 2 claims that the optimization Problem (2) is equivalent to Problem (3) if we also impose
no redundancy, i.e., xi 6= xj for i 6= j. The proof of Lemma 1, which is delayed to the Appendix A,
shows that for any redundant solution (γ, x), there is a non-redundant version with a lower value,
using the subadditivity in γ. Although it seems easier to consider the dimensionally finite Problem (3),
it is no longer convex in its variables. Theorem 3 gives sufficient conditions for the existence of a
minimum. Its proof is delayed to Appendix A.
Theorem 3. If the prior is discrete of size K, X is compact and c(·, yk) is lower semi-continuous for
every k ≤ K, then (PRL) has a minimum.
5 Private Learning as Sinkhorn Divergence Minimization
Formally, (PRL) is expressed as a regularized Optimal Transport Minimization. In this section, we
focus on the case where the privacy cost is the mutual information, as this problem will become a
Sinkhorn divergence minimization with computationally tractable optimization schemes [40]. If the
privacy cost is the KL divergence between the posterior and the prior, i.e., f(t) = t log(t), then the
regularization term corresponds to the mutual information I(X;Y ). It is a widely used privacy cost
[11, 9, 18] despite some limitations [48].
Recall that the Sinkhorn divergence for given distributions (µ, ν) ∈ ∆(X )×∆(Y) is defined by
OTc,λ(µ, ν) := min
γ∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
c(x, y)dγ(x, y) + λ
∫
log
(
dγ(x, y)
dµ(x)dν(y)
)
dγ(x, y), (4)
where Π(µ, ν) = {γ ∈ ∆(X × Y) | pi1#γ = µ and pi2#γ = ν}. Problem (PRL) w.r.t. mutual
information can then be rewritten as the following Optimal Transport minimization:
inf
µ∈∆(X )
OTc,λ(µ, p0).
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While the regularization term is usually only added to speed up the computations, it here directly
appears in the cost of the original problem ! An approximation of OTc,λ(µ, ν) can then be quickly
computed for discrete distributions using Sinkhorn algorithm [13].
In the original problem, µ might lie in an infinite dimensional space. We instead look for an optimal
distribution through a parametrized family µθ =
∑K+2
j=1 αj(θ)δxj(θ) as usually done [25, 20]. The
major downside is that the problem is no longer convex. In the following, p0 and the parametrized
distributions are assumed discrete. In case of continuous distributions, they could still be approximated
using sampled discrete distributions as previously done for generative models [25, 23].
5.1 Minimization Algorithm
The global optimization scheme is described in Algorithm 1. The main difficulties come from the
computation of the objective function and its gradient.
Sinkhorn algorithm. It was recently sug-
gested to use the Sinkhorn algorithm, which
has a linear convergence rate, to compute
OTc,λ(µ, ν) for distributions µ =
∑n
i=1 αiδxi
and ν =
∑m
j=1 βjδyj [32, 13]. Let K be
the exponential cost matrix defined by Ki,j =
e−
c(xi,yj)
λ . Any solution can be seen as a matrix
in the discrete case, and the unique solution γ of
the Problem (4) has the form diag(u)Kdiag(v).
The Sinkhorn algorithm then updates (u, v) ←
(α/Kv, β/K>u) (with component-wise divi-
sion) for n iterations or until convergence.
Algorithm 1 Optimization scheme
Input: discrete prior p0, cost function c
Output: strategy µθ
Initialize θ
Until convergence do
cost← Sinkhornn(µθ, p0, c, λ)
{n iterations of Sinkhorn algorithm}
∇θ ← AutoDiffθ(loss)
θ ← Update(θ,∇θ) {gradient descent}
end
return µθ
Gradient computation. Computing∇OTc,λ is a difficult task in Algorithm 1. A simple solution
consists in using automatic differentiation, i.e., computing the gradient using the chain rule over the
simple successive operations computed during the Sinkhorn algorithm [25].
The gradient can also be computed from the dual solution of Problem (4) [20, 34]. This method
is faster as it does not need to store all the Sinkhorn iterations in memory and backpropagate
through them afterwards. Convergence of Sinkhorn has yet to be guaranteed to provide an accurate
approximation of the gradient (see discussion in [40]).
6 Experiments and particular cases
In this section, the case of linear utility cost is first presented and shown to have relations with DC
programming. The theory of DC programming allows efficient algorithms and the performances of
different possible optimization schemes are compared on a simple example. Simulations based on
Algorithm 1 are then run for the real problem of online repeated auctions.
6.1 Linear utility cost
Section 4 described a general optimization scheme for Problem (PRL) with a discrete type prior.
It used a dimensionally finite, non-convex problem. An objective is then to find a local minimum.
Local minima can be found using classical techniques of gradient descent [52]. However in some
particular cases, better schemes are possible as claimed in Section 5 for the particular case of entropic
regularization. In this section, the case of a linear utility for any privacy cost is considered and we show
it is related to DC programming [28]. A standard DC program is of the form minx∈X f(x)− g(x),
where both f and g are convex functions and specific optimization schemes are then possible
[49, 29, 28]. In the case of linear utility costs over a hyperrectangle, PRL can be reformulated as a
DC program stated in Theorem 4. Its proof is delayed to Appendix A.
Theorem 4. If X =
d∏
l=1
[al, bl] and c(x, y) = x>y, then (PRL) is equivalent to the DC program
min
γ∈R(K+2)×K+
{
λ
∑
i,k
pk0hk(γi)−
K+2∑
i=1
‖
K∑
k=1
γi,kφ(yk)‖1 ; ∀k ≤ K,
K+2∑
i=1
γi,k = p
k
0
}
,
with φ(y)l := bl−al2 y
l and hk(γi) :=
(∑K
m=1 γi,m
)
f
(
γi,k
pk0
∑K
m=1 γi,m
)
.
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More generally, if the cost c is concave and the action space X is a polytope, optimal actions are
located on the vertices of X . In that case, we can therefore replace X by the set of its vertices and the
problem becomes a dimensionally finite convex problem as already claimed in Section 3. Unfortu-
nately, for some polytopes such as hyperrectangles, the number of vertices grows exponentially with
the dimension and the optimization scheme is no longer tractable in large dimensions.
6.2 Comparison of convergence rates on a simple toy example
We first compare the performance of different algorithms on a simple example. We consider the
linear utility loss c(x, y) = x>y over the space X = [−1, 1]d and the Kullback-Leibler divergence
as privacy cost, so that both DC and Sinkhorn schemes are possible. Different methods exist for DC
programming and they compute either a local or a global minimum. We choose the DCA algorithm
[49] as it computes a local minimum and is thus comparable to the other considered schemes. We
then compare the convergence rates of Algorithm 1, DCA and a naive gradient descent on (x, γ).
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Figure 2: Comparison of optimization schemes with different learning rates (lr).
We optimized using projected gradient descent for different learning rates without any parameteriza-
tion. The prior pk0 is proportional to e
Zk , where Zk is chosen uniformly at random in [0, 1]. Each yi
is taken uniformly at random in [−1, 1] and is rescaled so that ‖yi‖1 = 1. The values are averaged
over 200 runs. Figure 2 compares the computation times for different values of the regularization
constant λ, the action space dimension d with the size of the prior K = 100.
The DC method finds better local minima than the other methods. This was already observed in
practice [49] and confirms that it is more adapted to the structure of the problem, but only applicable
in very specific cases, such as linear costs on hyperrectangles. Also, the naive descent converges to
spurious local minima as it optimizes in higher dimensional spaces than the Sinkhorn method.
The Sinkhorn method seems to perform better for larger values of λ as seen in Figure 2, even if
the DC technique outperforms it after some time. Indeed, given the actions, the Sinkhorn method
computes the best joint distribution for each iteration and thus performs well when the privacy cost is
predominant, while the DC method here computes the best actions given a joint distribution and thus
performs well when the utility cost is predominant. It is thus crucial to choose the method which is
most adapted to the problem structure as it can lead to significant improvement in the solution.
6.3 Utility-privacy trade-off on online repeated auctions
For repeated second price auctions with personalized reserve price [39], there exist numerical methods
to implement an optimal strategy for the bidder [38]. For simplicity, we will only consider exponential
distributions of the bidder’s valuations, so that the private type y corresponds to the only parameter of
this distribution, i.e., its expectation. Moreover, we assume that the prior p0 over y is the discretized
uniform distribution on [0, 1] with a support of size K = 10; let {yj}j=1,...,K be the support of p0.
In repeated auctions, values v are repeatedly sampled from the distribution µyj and a bidder policy is
a mapping β(·) from values to bids, i.e., she bids β(v) if her value is v. So a type yj and a policy
β(·) generate the bid distribution β#µyj , which corresponds to an action in X in our setting. As a
consequence, the set of actions of the agent is the probability distribution over R+ and an action ρi
is naturally generated [44] from the valuation distribution via the optimal monotone transport map
denoted by βij , i.e., ρi = β
i
j#µyj . In the particular case of exponential distributions, this implies that
βji (v) = βi(v/yj) where βi is the unique monotone transport from Exp(1) to ρi. The revenue of the
bidder is then deduced for exponential distributions [38] as
r(βi, yj) = 1− c(βi, yj) = Ev∼Exp(1)
((
yjv − βi(v) + β′i(v)
)
G
(
βi(v)
)
1βi(v)−β′i(v)≥0
)
,
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where G is the cdf of the maximum bid of the other bidders. We here consider a single non-strategic
opponent with a uniform value distribution on [0, 1], so that G(x) = min(x, 1).
Since the prior is discrete, Theorem 2 states that an ε−optimal solution has a finite support of size
K + 2. It therefore remains to find the K + 2 actions that are going to be used (those actions are
bid distributions, or equivalently transport maps βi) and a joint distribution on the set of (βi, yj). To
compute the optimal transport maps βi, we represent and learn them as a single layer neural network
of 100 ReLUs (the utility is averaged over 103 samples at each training time step and on 106 samples
for the final evaluation). Figure 3 represents both utility and privacy as a function of the regularization
factor λ and a typical example of joint distribution γ for a specific value of the regularization constant.
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(b) Joint distribution heat-map, with λ = 0.01.
Figure 3: Privacy-utility trade-off in online repeated auctions.
Naturally, both the bidder revenue and the privacy loss decrease with λ, going from revealing
strategies for λ ' 10−3 to non-revealing strategies for larger λ. They significantly drop at a critical
point near 0.05. Although the bidder revenue does not significantly change (from 0.25 to 0.23), it
still represents a 8% revenue difference between the non revealing strategy and the partially revealing
strategy in Figure 3b. The latter randomizes the type over its possible neighbors and reveals more
information when the revenue is more sensible to the action, i.e., for low types yj here. While this
strategy prevents inference on the bidder’s type, the auctioneer can still infer an interval in which it is.
If this kind of inference also has to be prevented, a more complex privacy cost is required.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the bidding strategy with the type and the regularization constant.
Figure 4 shows the most used action for different types and λ. In the revealing strategy (λ = 0),
the action seems to be the same single function rescaled by the type. But as λ grows, this rescaling
shrinks so that the actions perform for several types, until having a single action in the non-revealing
strategy. This shrinkage is also more important for large values of yj . This confirms the observation
made above: the player loses less by hiding her type for large values than for low values and she is
thus more willing to hide her type when it is large.
Besides confirming expected results, this illustrates how the Privacy-Regularized Learning framework
is adapted to complex utility costs and action spaces, such as distribution or function spaces.
7 Conclusion
We formalized a new private learning concept, allowing strategies that reveal private information if it
induces a significant increase in utility. For specific costs, it benefits from recent advances of Optimal
Transport, which make the problem efficiently solvable for complex action spaces or utility costs.
The considered privacy costs can show limitations, especially for multidimensional or metric type
spaces; extending this framework to other privacy costs would have a great impact.
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. The constraint set is obviously convex. The first integral is linear and thus
convex in γ. It remains to show that the privacy loss is also convex in γ. As D is an f -divergence,
the privacy cost is
cpriv(γ) :=
∫
X×Y
D (px, p0) dγ(x, y) =
∫
X
∫
Y
f
( dγ(x, y)
dγ1(x)dp0(y)
)
dp0(y)dγ1(x),
where γ1 = pi1#γ. For t ∈ (0, 1) and two distributions γ and µ, we can define the convex
combination ν = tγ+(1−t)µ. By linearity of the projection pi1, ν1 = tγ1 +(1−t)µ1. The convexity
of cpriv actually results from the convexity of the perspective of f defined by g(x1, x2) = x2f(x1/x2)
[6]. It indeed implies
f
( dγ(x, y)
dγ1(x)dp0(y)
)
tdγ1(x) + f
( dµ(x, y)
dµ1(x)dp0(y)
)
(1− t)dµ1(x) ≤ f
( dν(x, y)
dν1(x)dp0(y)
)
dν1(x).
The result then directly follows when summing over X × Y .
Proof of Theorem 2. Let (pk)k and µ be an ε-optimal solution of this problem. We define g0(x) =∑
k
[
pk(x)c(x, yk) + λp
k
0(x)f
(
pk(x)
pk0
) ]
and gk = pk for 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Let αj(µ) =
∫
X gjdµ for
0 ≤ j ≤ K. The considered solution µ is included in a convex hull as follows:
(αj(µ))0≤j≤K ∈ Conv{(gj(x))0≤j≤K / x ∈ X}.
So by Caratheodory theorem, there exist K + 2 points xi ∈ X such that (αj(µ))0≤j≤K =∑K+2
i=1 ti(gj(xi))0≤j≤K where (ti) is a convex combination. Let µ
′ =
∑K+2
i=1 tiδxi . We then have
αj(µ
′) = αj(µ) for all j, which means that (µ′, (pk)k) is also an ε-optimal solution of Problem (2)
and the support of µ′ is a subset of {xi | i ∈ [K + 2]}.
Proof of Lemma 1. Theorem 2 claims that Problem (2) is equivalent to Problem (3) if we also impose
xi 6= xj for i 6= j. The value of Problem (3) is lower than the value of Problem (2) as we consider a
larger feasible set. Let us consider a redundant solution (γ, x) with xi = xj for i 6= j. We now show
that a non redundant version of this solution will have a lower value.
Let hk(γi) :=
(∑K
m=1 γi,m
)
f
(
γi,k
pk0
∑K
m=1 γi,m
)
, with the conventions f(0) = lim
x→0
f(x) ∈ R ∪
{+∞} and hk(γi) = 0 if
∑K
m=1 γi,m = 0.
The functions hk are convex functions because of the convexity of the perspectives of convex
functions [6]. Also, they are obviously homogeneous of degree 1. These two properties imply
that the hk are subadditive. Thus, let (γ′, x′) be defined by γ′l,k := γl,k and x
′
l := xl for any
l 6∈ {i, j}; γ′i,k := γi,k + γj,k, γ′j,k := 0 for any k, x′i := xi and let x′j be any element in
X \ {xl | 1 ≤ l ≤ K + 2}. The subadditivity of hk implies hk(γ′i) + hk(γ′j) ≤ hk(γi) + hk(γj) for
any k. The other terms in the objective function will be the same for (γ, x) and (γ′, x′). It thus holds∑
i,k
γi,kc(xi, yk) + λ
∑
i,k
pk0hk(γi) ≥
∑
i,k
γ′i,kc(x
′
i, yk) + λ
∑
i,k
pk0hk(γ
′
i).
(γ′, x′) is in the feasible set of Problem (3) and we removed a redundant condition from x. We can
thus iteratively construct a solution (γ˜, x˜) until reaching non redundancy. We then have (γ˜, x˜) in the
feasible set of Problem (2) and its value is lower than the value of (γ, x). This means that allowing
redundancy does not change the infimum of the problem, i.e., this yields Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 3. Theorem 3 comes from the lower semi-continuity of the objective func-
tion, as claimed by Lemma 2, whose proof is given below. We recall that hk(γi) =(∑K
m=1 γi,m
)
f
(
γi,k
pk0
∑
m γi,m
)
.
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Lemma 2. For any k in {1, . . . ,K}, hk is lower semi-continuous.
Let (γ(n), x(n))n be a feasible sequence whose value converges to this infimum. As the constraint
set is compact, we can assume after extraction that (x(n), γ(n))→ (x, γ). As c(·, yk) and hk are all
lower semi-continuous, the value of the limit is smaller than the limit value. This implies that the
infimum is reached in (γ, x).
Proof of Lemma 2. f is convex on R∗+. As a consequence, it is also continuous on R∗+. If
lim
x→0+
f(x) ∈ R, then f can be extended as a continuous function on R+ and all the hk are thus
continuous.
Otherwise, f is still continuous on R∗+ and lim
x→0+
f(x) = +∞. Thus, hk is continuous at γi as soon
as γi,j > 0 for every j. If γi,k = 0, but the sum
∑K
l=1 γi,l is strictly positive, then hk(γi) = +∞,
but as soon as ρ→ γ, we also have an infinite limit, because ρi,k
pk0
∑
l ρi,l
→ 0.
If
∑K
l=1 γi,l = 0, then lim infρ→γ f
(
ρi,k
pk0
∑
l
ρi,l
)
∈ R ∪ {+∞}. As we multiply this term by a factor
going to 0, lim inf
ρ→γ hk(ρi) ≥ 0 = hk(γi). Thus, in any case, hk is lower semi-continuous.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let ψ be the rescaling of X to [−1, 1]d, i.e., ψ(x)l := 2xl−bl−albl−al . Then,
c(x, y) = ψ(x)Tφ(y) + η(y) where φ(y)l := (bl − al)y
l
2 and η(y) =
d∑
l=1
al+bl
bl−al y
l. Problem (3) is
then equivalent to:
inf
(γ,x)∈R(K+2)×K×[−1,1]d×(K+2)
γ≥0∑
i γi,k=p
k
0
∑
i,k
γi,k(x
>
i φ(yk) + η(yk)) + λ
∑
i,k
pk0hk(γi).
Because of the marginal constraints,
∑
i,k
γi,kη(yk) =
∑
k
pk0η(yk). This sum does not depend neither
on x nor γ, so that the terms η(yk) can be omitted. The problem then becomes
inf
(γ,x)∈R(K+2)×K×[−1,1]d×(K+2)
γ≥0∑
i γi,k=p
k
0
∑
i
x>i
(∑
k
γi,kφ(yk)
)
+ λ
∑
i,k
pk0hk(γi).
It is clear for this problem that for a fixed γ, the best xi corresponds to xli = −sign(
∑
k
γi,kφ(yk)
l)
and the term x>i
(∑
k
γi,kφ(yk)
)
then corresponds to the opposite of the 1-norm of
∑
k
γi,kφ(yk),
i.e., the problem is then:
inf
γ∈R(K+2)×K
γ≥0∑
i γi,k=p
k
0
−
∑
i
‖
∑
k
γi,kφ(yk)‖1 + λ
∑
i,k
pk0hk(γi).
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